Hannibal's father went about the conquest of Hispania with all the skills given to military men.
Hannibal Barca ("mercy of Baal) was the son of Hamilcar Barca.
The onslaught of Hannibal's cavalry was irresistible, and Hasdrubal, his brother, who commanded the left, pushed in the Roman right and then swept across the rear and attacked Varro's cavalry on the Roman left.
Hannibal, by skillful maneuvers, was in position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road between Placentia and Arminum, by which Sempronius would have to march in order to reinforce Scipio.
Any bias attributed to Polybius, however, is more troublesome, since he was clearly sympathetic towards Hannibal.
The Romans utilized the attritional strategies Fabius had taught them, and which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of defeating Hannibal.
Hannibal repeatedly appealed to the Carthaginian oligarchy for reinforcements and aid.
Hannibal captured Tarentum but he failed to obtain control of the harbor.
Hannibal's perilous march brought him into Roman territory and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on foreign ground.
Alfred Graf von Schlieffen’s eponymously-titled Schlieffen Plan was developed from his military studies, with particularly heavy emphasis on Hannibal's victory at Cannae.
Departing from Roman military traditions, he adopted the Fabian strategy of refusing open battle with his opponent while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal’s vicinity to limit his movement.
In 203 B.C.E., when Scipio was carrying all before him in Africa and the Carthaginian peace party were arranging an armistice, Hannibal was recalled from Italy by the war party at Carthage.
Despite this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively encamped at Arretium.
Defeated in a naval battle, Hannibal fled again, this time to the Bithynian court.
Expecting Hannibal to carry on advancing to Rome, Cnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius (the new Consuls of Rome) took their armies to block the Eastern and Western routes Hannibal could use to get to Rome.
The Romans deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle and instead, assaulted his weakening army with multiple smaller armies in an attempt to both weary him and create unrest in his troops.
Unable to draw Flaminius into battle by mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome (thus executing the first conscious turning movement in military history).
To avoid this, Hannibal deceived the Romans into thinking that the Carthaginian Army was going to escape through the woods.
Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain.
Having ravaged Apulia without provoking Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to Campania, one of the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw Fabius into battle.
According to Cicero, while at the court of Antiochus, Hannibal attended a lecture by Phormio, a philosopher, that ranged through many topics.
When he was killed in a battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded to his command of the army.
Through prompt decision and speedy movement, he succeeded in transporting his army to Italy by sea, in time to meet Hannibal.
Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul with 50,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 horsemen.
Hannibal’s army, significantly supplemented, now stood poised to invade Italy.
Nevertheless, without the resources his allies could contribute, or reinforcements from Carthage, Hannibal could not make further significant gains.
Hannibal is reported to have told his father, "I swear so soon as age will permit… I will use fire and steel to arrest the destiny of Rome.
After outmaneuvering the natives, who had tried to prevent his crossing, Hannibal evaded a Roman force sent to operate against him in Gaul.
Hamilcar agreed and forced Hannibal swear that as long as he lived he would never be a friend of Rome.
Hannibal knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and certainly the quickest route to Central Italy.
Seven years after the victory of Zama, the Romans, alarmed by Carthage's renewed prosperity, demanded Hannibal's surrender.
Fabius closely followed Hannibal’s path of destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn into battle, and thus remained on the defensive.
Despite the apparent unanimity of the acceptance of war, Hanno the Great, the leader of the pro-Roman Peace Party, condemned Hannibal’s actions.
The Roman and Allied legions of the Consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward to Apulia.
Following the conclusion of a peace that left Carthage stripped of its formerly mighty empire Hannibal prepared to take a back seat for a time.
was the defection of Capua, the second largest city of Italy, which Hannibal made his new base.
Hannibal recognized that he still needed to cross the Pyrenees, the Alps, and many significant rivers.
The aging Hannibal was suffering from mental exhaustion and deteriorating health after years of campaigning in Italy.
Meanwhile, Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at Herdonea in Apulia, but lost Tarentum in the following year.
The Consul Varro, who was in command on the first day, was a man of reckless and hubristic nature, and was determined to defeat Hannibal.
Prusias agreed to give him up, but Hannibal was determined not to fall into his enemies' hands.
Hannibal is universally ranked as one of the greatest military commanders and tacticians in history.
Hannibal soon saw that the king's army was no match for the Romans.
The combination of these events marked the end to Hannibal's success in Italy.
When Phormio finished a discourse on the duties of a general, Hannibal was asked his opinion.
Hannibal perceived this as a breach of the treaty signed with Hasdrubal and so he laid siege to the city, which fell after eight months.
After Cannae, the Romans refused to fight Hannibal in pitched battles, aiming instead to defeat him by attrition, relying on their advantages of supply and manpower.
Hannibal again proved his superiority in tactics by a severe defeat inflicted at Herdoniac (modern Ordona) in Apulia upon a proconsular army, and in 208 B.C.E.
The effect on morale of this victory meant that most of southern Italy joined Hannibal's cause.
Hannibal was now determined to carry the war into the heart of Italy by a rapid march through Hispania and southern Gaul (France).
Arriving that evening, Lee was informed that he was to turn Crazy Horse over to the Officer of the Day.
Hannibal was acclaimed commander-in-chief by the army and confirmed in his appointment by the Carthaginian government.
Another story about Hannibal in exile gives a strange slant to his supposed Punic perfidy.
Hannibal capitalized on the eagerness of Varro and drew him into a trap by using an envelopment tactic which eliminated the Roman numerical advantage by shrinking the surface area where combat could occur.
Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed King Hieronymous of Syracuse, Italy.
The office had become rather insignificant, but Hannibal restored its power and authority.
Having secured his position in northern Italy by this victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter with the Gauls, whose support for him abated.
Due to these brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers, managed to surround and destroy all but a small remainder of this force.
Hannibal successfully crossed the mountains, despite numerous obstacles such as harsh climate and terrain, the Guerrilla warfare tactics of the native tribes, and the challenge of commanding an army diverse in race and language.
The battle resulted in a loss of respect for Hannibal by his fellow Carthaginians.
Hannibal was still only in his forty-sixth year and soon showed that he could be a statesman as well as a soldier.
George S. Patton believed that he was a reincarnation of General Hannibal.
According to Strabo and Plutarch, Hannibal also received hospitality at the Armenian court of Artaxias I where he planned and supervised the building of the new royal capital Artaxata.
According to a story he later told at the court of Antiochus, Hannibal came upon his father while he was making a sacrifice to the gods before leaving for Hispania.
Polybius claims that four days and three nights Hannibal’s men marched “through a route which was under water” suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced lack of sleep.
So effectively did Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy tribute imposed by Rome could be paid by installments without additional and extraordinary taxation.
After allowing his soldiers a brief rest to recover from their exertions, Hannibal first secured his rear by subduing the hostile tribe of the Taurini (modern Turin).
Military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge once famously christened Hannibal the "father of strategy" for the reason that even his greatest enemy, Rome, came to adopt elements of his military tactics in their strategic canon.
Hannibal drew up his least reliable infantry in a semicircle in the center with the wings composed of the Gallic and Numidian horse.
Most of the sources available to historians about Hannibal are Romans, who considered him the greatest enemy they had ever faced.
Hannibal continues to enjoy a strong reputation in the modern world.
After outmaneuvering the natives, who had tried to prevent his crossing, Hannibal evaded a Roman force sent to operate against him in Gaul.
Hannibal continued defeating the Romans whenever he could bring them into battle, yet he was never able to complete another decisive victory that produced a lasting strategic effect.